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Abstract 
A matter of long-standing policy concern is the limited extent to which many countries in Africa have 
been able to diversify their economies. The global phenomenon of supply chain trade in principle 
generates opportunities for specialization in processing activities and labour- or natural-resource 
intensive tasks that are part of international value chains. This paper discusses what role international 
organizations – in particular the global trade body, the WTO, and the multilateral financial institutions 
– have played in assisting efforts to enhance the ability of firms in Africa to participate in value chains 
by lowering trade costs, suggests some implications for trade governance at both the national and 
global level. 
Keywords 
African economic integration, supply chains, international organizations, development assistance, 
trade costs 
 1 
Introduction* 
The average level of import protection around the world has dropped to the 5-10 percent range (Kee et 
al., 2009). In conjunction with technological changes that greatly reduced trade costs—
telecommunications, the Internet, containerization and other improvements in logistics—the result was 
a sustained boom in world trade. The value of global trade in goods and services passed the US$20 
trillion mark in 2011 (WTO, 2012) or 59 percent of global GDP, up from 39 percent of GDP in 1990.
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This increase in internationalization was due in no small part to ever greater “vertical specialization”, 
with firms and plants in different countries specializing in different parts of the value chain for a 
product. The share of manufactures in total exports of developing countries increased from just 30 
percent in 1980 to over 70 percent today, with a substantial proportion of this comprising intra-
industry trade—the exchange of similar, differentiated products. Since the 1990s Intra-industry trade 
ratios for high growth developing and transition economies have risen to 50 percent or higher. Much 
of this comprises intra-regional trade. For example, about half of all East Asian exports of 
manufactured goods go to other East Asian economies. 
Of course, there is substantial variation across countries and regions. Sub-Saharan African 
countries in particular remain heavily dependent on natural resources and agricultural products. And 
although there has been a sea change in trade policy everywhere, the poorest countries, many of which 
are in Africa, often tend to have the highest barriers. Africa is also one of the least integrated 
continents in terms of “connectivity”, reflecting weaknesses in infrastructure and limited regional 
integration. There has been progress in the last decade in pursuit of regional economic integration 
among subsets of African states, but to date the continent as a whole and the various sub-regions have 
not seen the shift towards intra-industry trade, vertical specialization and participation in international 
supply chains that has been a driver of growth in other parts of the world. This is particularly 
unfortunate because global value chains offer an opportunity for firms in Africa to engage in 
international production in a way that was much less feasible 20-30 years ago. Integration into a 
supply chain allows a firm to specialize in a narrow activity and add value to a product that can be sold 
anywhere in the world. But preconditions for this are that trade barriers are low, because being part of 
a supply chain means many of the inputs that are needed must be imported from foreign firms that are 
“upstream” in the chain, and that trade costs are low enough to make production profitable. 
Many different institutions and groups play a role in supporting the economic integration of 
African economies including states, business, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs. In this 
paper I discuss what two types of international organizations (IOs) can do in this regard, and whether 
there are opportunities to do better. I will limit my focus to trade (the WTO) and multilateral 
development organizations (primarily the World Bank) and the relationship between these two types 
of IOs—an issue that is sometimes discussed under the heading of “coherence”. Although the focus is 
mainly on the WTO and the World Bank, much of the discussion applies as well to other international 
trade institutions such as regional trade agreements and to other providers of development assistance. 
It is important to note at the outset that the discussion will not do justice to what development 
organizations do, as they are active on many fronts that are directly or indirectly relevant to economic 
integration. Much of their activity aims at bolstering productivity performance, e.g., by strengthening 
the investment climate, increasing human capital and improving public health. All of these impact on 
economic opportunities and outcomes. A country’s trade-related policies are determined by 
governments. Trade IOs can be used by governments to establish rules of the game for policies, and 
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development IOs can advise on the design of institutional frameworks to support an open trade regime 
and provide financial and technical support to improve trade-related infrastructure, both hard (roads, 
ports, etc.) and soft (policies, standards-upgrading, export promotion services, border management 
procedures, etc.) The extent to which IOs do this depends in part on whether trade competitiveness and 
economic integration are priorities for a government. The effectiveness of the support provided also 
depends importantly on governments, as this will be determined in part by the ability to coordinate 
across ministries and regulatory bodies as well as providers of technical and financial assistance. At 
the end of the day much of the burden of greater coherence rests on governments both individually and 
collectively, as all IOs are governed by their members.  
What follows very briefly summarizes some of the main reasons identified in the literature why 
Africa has seen less diversification and specialization in processing activities and “intermediate” parts 
of international value chains for goods (Section 1) .This is followed by a discussion of the role IOs can 
play and have played in addressing these various factors, in particular the global trade organization, 
the GATT/WTO (Section 2) and the multilateral development organizations (Section 3). Section 4 
assesses what might be done to bolster the effectiveness of IOs in supporting African economic 
integration, both regionally and into the world economy, and suggests some implications for trade 
governance at both the national and global level (Section 4). Section 5 concludes. 
1. Factors affecting African economic integration 
African countries are active traders – the ratio of trade to GDP is often above 60 percent. What 
distinguishes African trade is the dominance of natural resources and agricultural exports and the very 
limited intra-regional trade that takes place (less than 10 percent of the total, as measured by official 
trade statistics).
2
 The prevailing pattern of trade reflects endowments and very high trade costs.
3
 Many 
African countries are rich in natural resources and most have large pools of relatively unskilled labor. 
High trade costs are the result of many factors, including trade policy. Tariffs or the rules of origin that 
apply among countries that have free trade agreements are examples, as are inefficient border 
management practices and nontariff barriers such as onerous compliance and conformity assessment 
processes, and restrictive regulations affecting the cross-border movement of trucks, traders, and 
products such as food.
4
 
Transport costs are high for many African nations simply because of geography. Many countries 
are land-locked and thus far from sea ports located in other countries, making the efficiency of 
transport corridors and border crossings of paramount importance for firm level competitiveness. 
Lowering trade costs is therefore not “simply” a matter of dealing with nontariff measures that apply 
at borders. Equally important in many countries are internal trade costs associated with frequent 
controls and stopping of trucks moving along corridors. To a significant extent the trade cost policy 
agenda also revolves around improving the performance of services sectors: reducing the costs of 
service inputs for firms and increasing the variety and quality of producer and backbone services such 
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 See Kathleen Hancock’s chapter in this volume and World Bank (2012). Informal trade within Africa is significant so 
that the actual figure is higher. However, this mostly comprises low value items and trade in foodstuffs. While important 
from a welfare perspective – this type of trade generates revenue for the small traders involved (who are often women) – 
it does not comprise the type of specialization that has supported growth in other parts of the world.  
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 Policies in the rest of the world also affect Africa’s export structure and trade volumes. Tariff peaks and tariff escalation 
in major export markets have had a negative effect on incentives to do more processing in Africa. The extensive support 
given to agricultural production in many OECD countries, combined with limited preferential market access programs for 
African producers of certain commodities – e.g., sugar – created incentives against diversification and upgrading and 
supported status quo bias because of the rents involved.  
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performance and the incentive structure confronting firms and farmers in Africa. See the annual World Bank reports 
Doing Business and ,Global Monitoring Report, Anderson and Masters (2009) on agricultural trade policies; Borchert at 
al. (2013) on services trade policies; and Arvis et al. (2012) for measures of logistics performance. 
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as transport are important determinants of the competitiveness of firms and farmers. Their ability to 
produce and sell their products on local, national and global markets and the rate of return they will 
obtain depends on the availability and cost of services (Francois and Hoekman, 2010). Wages in much 
of Africa are among the lowest in the world making the region potentially attractive for investment in 
relatively unskilled labour-intensive export production of the type that has tended to be a key feature 
of the development strategy undertaken by Asian countries, most recently and notably China. As real 
wages in China continue to increase, African countries become more attractive for 
manufacturing/processing investment, but the speed and extent to which this will happen will depend 
in part on reducing trade costs. 
Achieving this is a complex, multi-dimensional challenge. Trade liberalization has an important 
role to play, but much of the agenda revolves around administrative practices and procedures. One 
example is border management – enhancing the efficiency of enforcing regulatory and fiscal policies 
(McLinden et al., 2010). Another example is making greater progress in achieving regional integration 
objectives, which can create larger markets and lower the costs of transit transport—a key factor for 
land-locked countries in particular (Arvis, Raballand and Marteau, 2010). The importance of reducing 
the costs of accessing and transiting neighbouring markets and attaining scale and agglomeration 
economies through convergence of administrative procedures and trade-related regulatory regimes is a 
major motivation underpinning regional integration efforts in Africa.  
While regional cooperation is important, much of the policy agenda involves autonomous, 
unilateral reforms. The potential benefits associated with a concerted effort to facilitate trade are large. 
A global dataset compiled by Arvis et al. (2013) suggest that improving logistics performance could 
reduce average bilateral trade costs ten times more than an equivalent percentage reduction in average 
tariffs. A report by the WEF, Bain and the World Bank (WEF et al. 2013) examines supply chain 
barriers to international trade and concludes that these are far more significant impediments than 
tariffs. It suggests that concerted action to reduce supply chain barriers to achieve a level that is 
equivalent to 50 percent of best practice observed in the world today could increase world GDP over 
six times more than removing all tariffs. The projected gains for African countries are among the 
highest, in the range of 10 percent of GDP or more, reflecting the high levels of barriers that prevail 
(Figure 1). This is an area where making progress requires cooperation and coordination across a 
range of institutions and stakeholders in a country, in part because there are investment costs 
associated with realizing these gains. This is a good example of the need for greater coherence, 
including on the part of what trade and development IOs do. 
Figure 1: Projected impact of reducing supply chain barriers to 50% of best practice 
 
Source: WEF, Bain and World Bank, 2013. 
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2. African trade policies and the GATT/WTO 
The global trade regime has provided a framework for countries to define trade policy disciplines 
commitments and a mechanism through which these can be enforced. The scope and coverage of 
policy disciplines has expanded steadily since the creation of the GATT in 1947, as has membership. 
Some 30 countries have acceded to the WTO since 1995, including many small developing and 
transition economies as well as China and Russia. A noteworthy feature of the accession process is 
that it entailed much more far-reaching policy commitments and reforms than those African countries 
made when they became contracting parties to the GATT (Braga and Cattaneo, 2009). Although 
accession takes too long and is too much subject to idiosyncratic demands by existing WTO members, 
the result of the process is generally that countries undertake numerous reforms, and, perhaps more 
important, for a period of time there is an explicit focus by government on the trade regime and trade 
policy institutions.  
Engagement by African states in the trading system has been characterized by insistence on “more 
favourable and differential treatment.” This was associated with an import substitution 
industrialization strategy and non-participation in multilateral rounds of tariff reduction/trade 
liberalization. The basic rationale for this approach was that developing countries needed to foster 
industrial capacity to reduce import dependence and to diversify away from traditional commodities. 
Diversification was needed because commodities were held to be subject to long-term declining terms 
of trade reflecting low income elasticity of demand, as well as short-term price volatility, and offered 
little scope for employment creation. At the same time it was recognized that exports were important 
as a source of foreign exchange and that the national market might be too small for a protected 
domestic industry to be able to realize economies of scale. This led to calls for preferential access to 
export markets through a general system of preferences that would give developing countries better 
than most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment in industrialized countries (Hudec, 1987).  
The end result was limited preferential access to OECD markets, as “sensitive” items tended to be 
excluded, and significant anti-export bias as a result of high rates of protection that were exempt from 
trade negotiations. The strategy of “less than full reciprocity” in GATT/WTO trade negotiations helps 
explain the long-standing tariff peaks and escalation in OECD countries: as these were on items of 
interest to African and other developing countries the lack of engagement implied no incentive to 
lower them.  
The strategy of not offering trade policy concessions has continued to be pursued in the WTO 
context. LDCs, which are mostly located in Africa, were granted “the round for free” in the DDA 
negotiations: it was agreed that they were not required to make any reductions in their tariff bindings. 
The focus of African countries has been on improving and defending preferential access to major 
export markets, not just OECD markets but also those of the rapidly growing emerging economies, 
and expanding/improving provisions for special and differential treatment.
5
 Progress was made in the 
post 2001 period following the launch of the DDA in expanding duty-free, quota-free market (DFQF) 
access for LDCs. This is a significant achievement, but it also had a downside by pitting developing 
countries against each other (DFQF only extends to the LDCs and not to other countries that may be 
very similar in terms of per capita income and other development indicators), and focusing attention 
on the preference erosion losses that might occur if the DDA were to lead to a substantial reduction in 
the applied MFN tariffs of preference-granting countries. This dynamic is illustrated most notably in 
the resistance by the United States to extending DFQF treatment to Asian LDCs (Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Laos), which is driven in part by concern that doing so would erode the value of the 
preferential market access provided under AGOA.  
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Particularly striking has been the limited degree to which attention has been given to subjects that 
matter greatly for competitiveness and that could therefore help improve trade conditions in African 
countries. Two areas stand out in this regard, services and trade facilitation. Both are of critical 
importance as policy reforms affecting these areas can have a major impact on trade costs confronting 
firms and farmers.  
On the positive side of the ledger, a major achievement was the launch of the “aid for trade” (AFT) 
initiative and the establishment of the Enhanced Integrated Framework for trade-related technical 
assistance. Although not formally tied to the DDA, these initiatives signified recognition by the WTO 
membership that market access and rules were not enough. The aid for trade initiative is a mechanism 
to engage development agencies more in the trade integration agenda and helps to raise the profile of 
trade issues in the process of determining priorities for investment and policy reform at the country 
level. The major challenge and opportunity looking forward is to do more to link AFT with the 
negotiation and implementation of specific commitments in policy areas such as services and trade 
facilitation, as it is there that the potential gains for African countries are the largest. 
The WTO can help countries to deal with the “real trade costs” agenda through agreements on 
frameworks that embody good practices and establish focal points for regular dialogue and monitoring 
of progress in implementation of good practices. The trade facilitation negotiations in the Doha Round 
illustrate how the WTO could be used by developing countries to make a difference on the ground for 
traders and producers. A key feature of the trade facilitation talks was a decision by developing 
countries to introduce a formal link between implementation of any agreement and to the provision of 
financial and technical assistance. Another feature of the negotiations was to engage the specialized 
agencies with expertise in the area in the process. Examples include the World Customs Organization, 
UNCTAD, the IMF and the World Bank. These agencies undertook assessments at country level of 
the trade facilitation situation, gaps and priorities, and can provide the assistance needed for 
implementation of reforms. The Doha Round process raised national awareness of the importance of 
trade facilitation and influenced the development community as well. A plethora of research on the net 
benefits of facilitating trade induced by the launch of the negotiations identified the high rate of return 
of investments in this area and the high opportunity cost of not dealing with the issue. As a result, the 
number of projects and level of resources allocated to this area increased significantly relative to the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. 
Emulating this approach in other areas of trade-related regulation could help make the WTO a 
more effective mechanism to assist countries reduce trade costs/improve competitiveness. Perhaps the 
most obvious and important area is services. Hoekman and Mattoo (2013) argue that progress in this 
area would be enhanced by taking regulatory concerns and constraints seriously. Liberalization of 
services policies is constrained by the great diversity in regulation and regulatory capacity. 
Mechanisms that bring together sectoral regulators, trade officials and business to assess current 
policies and to identify beneficial reforms are needed. Strengthening the relevant implementing 
institutions will require the engagement of a variety of national, regional and international institutions.  
This is an area where greater ‘coherence’ is needed between trade organizations such as the WTO 
that establish rules of the trade game and the trade and development organizations that have the 
technical expertise, resources and country presence to support reform processes. Moving in this 
direction implies a shift away from the long-standing insistence on “special and differential treatment 
(SDT) in the WTO, which is more about exceptions and exemptions as opposed to constructive 
engagement and mobilization of support to help governments put in place better policy frameworks 
and achieve national objectives. Traditional SDT has been a weak reed that has generated little in the 
way of direct benefits and arguably has resulted in significant opportunity costs in terms of benefits 
foregone (Hoekman, 2005). It has meant less market access in areas of export interest (continued tariff 
escalation/peaks in major export markets during the 1970s and 1980s for example, less in the way of 
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benefits from applying WTO trade policy disciplines, including very limited use of WTO dispute 
settlement procedures and the WTO’s transparency mechanisms.6  
Key elements of the SDT strategy pursued by many developing countries are arguably 
misconceived because they do little to address the key factors that matter for competitiveness and that 
could therefore help improve trade performance. Four areas stand out in this regard – tariffs; the cost 
and quality of service inputs; reducing the trade-impeding effects of non-tariff measures (NTMs); and 
trade facilitation/border management. Policy reforms affecting these areas can have a major positive 
impact in terms of reducing the trade costs confronting firms and farmers. A large and expanding body 
of research has documented that the potential benefits for the world as a whole of action in these areas 
are substantial (Laborde et al. 2011; Decreux and Fontagne, 2011; WEF, 2013). DFQF access for 
LDCs and AFT are both important post-2001 achievements, but much depends on how the latter is 
used to help firms benefit from the former.  
Given that average MFN tariffs are declining steadily, the value of DFQF treatment is inherently 
limited. It can only partially make up for the high trade costs that confront African enterprises. The 
key challenge and priority is improving the domestic “trade environment”. AFT can help but how it is 
allocated and how much it is used is very much a function of what governments want to use it for, and 
whether they make trade a priority area for investment/reform. AFT allocation and effectiveness is 
also a function of the “supply side.” Demand may exceed supply, and there are invariably important 
coordination challenges to be overcome within government, as well as across and within development 
agencies. 
3. International financial/development organizations 
The international financial institutions (IFIs) played a significant role in supporting trade reforms in 
developing countries in recent decades. They have a mandate to engage governments on the content of 
trade policy and to provide advice on, and analysis of, trade policies and trade-related reforms. They 
also have the ability to identify the need for complementary reforms and investments and engage in 
policy dialogue on areas critical for competitiveness. Examples include the level of the (real) exchange 
rate, the exchange rate regime, and the monetary and fiscal policies that affect these variables. The 
IFIs could complement technical analysis and advice on the design of policies with financial resources 
to assist countries to implement reforms and improve supply capacity. Between 1987 and 2004, for 
example, the World Bank allocated some 8 percent of its total loans and credits to programs and 
projects aimed at trade policy reforms, strengthening trade-related institutions and infrastructure (e.g., 
product standards; Customs) (World Bank, 2006). The IMF supported economic adjustment programs 
in 34 Sub-Saharan African countries between 1993 and 2003. In 31 of these countries programs were 
implemented that included trade policy reform conditions (Wei and Zhang, 2006). The World Bank 
and IMF programs were generally informed by extensive analysis and research on trade issues, 
ranging from the design of reforms to assessments of the impacts and results of different types of trade 
policies. Several influential multi-country case studies of prevailing trade policy regimes and 
economic performance played a role in identifying priorities for reform in the mid- to late 1980s (e.g., 
Bhagwati, 1978; Krueger, 1978; Choksi, Michaely and Papageorgiou, 1991;.Thomas et al., 1991).  
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objectives. In my view arguments that the WTO has “kicked away the ladder” are largely incorrect – governments 
continue to have a very substantial degree of “policy space” to pursue measures that aim at offsetting market failures and 
creating an enabling business environment. Insofar as there are specific WTO disciplines that are deemed to be too 
constraining, there are numerous channels to relax these, ranging from requests for waivers to the (re-)negotiation process 
– as was done in the case of TRIPS and access to medicines and action by developing countries to safeguard the ability to 
use export subsidies (see Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009).  
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One focus of these programs was to reduce disincentives to engage in export production, boost 
export performance and improve resource allocation, thereby making economies more robust to 
changes in the world economy, whether these are technological in nature or short term exogenous 
shocks. The objective was to increase incentives for investments in new activities and products so as 
to diversify the economy and generate new sources of foreign exchange. A key part of many programs 
was to enable firms to have access to the inputs they needed at world market prices – thereby allowing 
them to compete on a level playing field with foreign competitors, and confronting firms with 
competition from imports, thereby ensuring that resources went to sectors in which a country had a 
comparative advantage. Creating an incentive framework that would generate a more efficient 
allocation of domestic labor and capital was seen as a precondition for sustaining higher economic 
growth over time.  
Trade reforms supported by the IFIs generally had common features: a removal of quantitative 
restrictions (QRs) on imports and exports; a reform of the structure of the tariff, generally moving 
towards a simpler and more transparent system of a limited number of tariff bands; the removal of 
tariff exemptions of various kinds; reducing net taxation of agriculture; and lowering the average level 
of the tariff. Frequently the tariff structure that was recommended involved higher tariffs on final 
products than on inputs—the idea being to afford industries a continued positive rate of effective 
protection against imports. The experience of many countries that implemented such trade reform 
packages, including in Africa (e.g., Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Malawi, Zambia), was that tariff 
revenue declines, a major concern for many low-income countries, were offset by the removal of tariff 
exemptions, the tariffication of quotas and the mobilization of other tax bases (Baunsgaard and Keen, 
2010; Keen and Mansour, 2010). Over time, as economic activity increased and trade expanded, tariff 
revenues might even increase as a result of import growth.  
Reforms generally went beyond narrow trade policy (tariffs, quotas). In many cases programs 
included an extensive focus on macroeconomic management driven by the need to move countries 
towards a more sustainable fiscal situation and control inflation. In many instances trade reforms 
included a devaluation of the real exchange rate. Depreciation created incentives to switch 
expenditures away from imports, thus helping to move the balance of payments towards surplus. 
Devaluation also played an important political economy role in helping to implement and sustain trade 
liberalization: by making imports more costly, some of the protection that was lost through lower trade 
barriers was offset. Conversely, devaluation made it easier for export-oriented firms to expand output 
and generate employment opportunities for workers in import substituting sectors that were negatively 
affected by liberalization. Complementary measures that were often pursued included the introduction 
of indirect tax systems (excises, value added taxation) and projects to bolster the supply side of the 
economy: efforts to restructure firms/industries with a view to improving efficiency, investments in 
infrastructure and education, etc.  
There have been many assessments of the trade reform programs and the assistance provided by the 
IFIs through the early 2000s (see e.g., Dean, Desai and Riedel, 1992; Sharer, 1998; Wei and Zhang, 
2006; World Bank, 1992, 2001 and 2006). While reform programs did not always have the desired 
effects and many were not sustained, the reforms increased growth rates by generating additional 
investment into the tradable sectors.
7
 Whatever the relative importance of the different drivers of 
reform, the result was a significant reduction in anti-export bias, greater neutrality in the incidence of 
policies across sectors, a reduction in the relative taxation of agriculture compared to other sectors 
(Anderson, 2009), and increases in investment, output and trade. This also occurred in Africa, 
although to a lesser extent than in other regions. Africa is the only region that still taxes farmers 
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and after trade reform. See also Greenaway et al. (2002). Krueger (2003) discusses the importance of the interplay 
between politics and the nature of governments across countries and the effectiveness of economic policies and policy 
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(Anderson and Masters, 2009). But similar to other parts of the world the magnitude of the rate of 
relative taxation has fallen – and greater trade openness in Africa has led to higher rates of growth 
(Bruckner and Lederman, 2012). 
Since the early 2000s World Bank support activities have put more emphasis on the reduction of 
real trade costs. The World Bank Group is the largest provider of financial assistance for trade 
integration if one uses the OECD definition of aid for trade (AFT).
8
 Africa is the largest recipient of 
World Bank AFT and has seen its share in the Bank’s overall support for trade activities rise to over 
one-third.
9
 The increasing emphasis on trade competitiveness and trade facilitation and logistics 
reflects demand for assistance in these areas from governments and a recognition that improving 
border management (the administrative procedures associated with the movement of goods across 
borders) and transport services policies can have a major impact on firm-level competitiveness and 
helps explain the lack of diversification in many African countries.
10
 Without action to reduce 
transport costs from remote areas, increase connectivity and facilitate the movement of goods, services 
and people across borders, specialization opportunities cannot be fully exploited, if at all, and the 
potential gains from trade will not be maximized. Poor roads and ports, poorly performing customs, 
weaknesses in border management, inadequate regulatory capacity, and limited access to finance and 
poor business services are all areas where development assistance can help to improve matters.  
Trade policy was a central element of many IMF programs in the 1980s and 1990s. From 2000 on 
less attention was given to trade matters in IMF lending, although trade policy is a standard element of 
IMF surveillance activities. The average number of trade policy conditions in IMF programs fell from 
over 2 to under 0.5 between 1998 and 2007. As of the late 2000s the traditional focus on trade 
liberalization was no longer visible in most country programs—insofar as trade was an element of 
lending programs policy conditions mostly pertained to Customs (IMF, 2009). The decline in focus on 
trade policy was a reflection of different factors, including lower tariffs in most countries, the limited 
connection between specific trade policies and macroeconomic performance, learning from the East 
Asian crisis (where many were of the view that a number of the trade-related conditions that were 
imposed by the Fund could not be justified as having a macroeconomic rationale) and a sense that with 
the establishment of the WTO and the increasing prominence of PTAs the need to focus on national 
trade policies had become weaker. A corollary of the shift away from trade conditionality by the IMF 
was a drop in the extent of trade policy analysis by Fund staff. In the late 1990s, three quarters of Fund 
staff reports included analysis of trade policy matters; as of 2006 the number had fallen to one-quarter 
(IMF, 2005; 2009).
11
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 The OECD/WTO definition of AFT includes trade policy and regulation, economic infrastructure (ports, roads, airports, 
telecommunications, and energy), capacity building, and trade-related budget support. Because it is impossible to 
distinguish which part of an infrastructure project is for a nontradable sector, the OECD considers all loans for 
infrastructure as AFT. 
9
 See World Bank (2011). 
10
 According to the World Bank’s annual Doing Business report, on average it takes three times as many days, nearly twice 
as many documents and six times as many signatures to trade in many African countries than in high income economies 
See e.g., Djankov et al. (2006), Freund and Rocha (2010), and Hoekman and Nicita (2011). 
11
 The IMF participates in the Enhanced Integrated Framework for trade-related technical assistance to LDCs, which among 
other things aims to help ensure that LDCs include relevant trade-related priorities in their Poverty Reduction and 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs). In principle IMF surveillance can help inform this process, and the IMF can provide technical 
assistance in specific areas (such as Customs). The IMF created the Trade Integration Mechanism (TIM) in 2004, an 
instrument to help countries where multilateral trade liberalization might create balance of payments problems. The TIM 
is not a new facility, however, but aims to make IMF assistance more predictably available. To date, three member 
countries (Bangladesh, the Dominican Republic, and the Republic of Madagascar) have obtained support under the 
TIM. 
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4. Challenges, gaps and opportunities  
The foregoing discussion illustrates that the World Bank has been providing substantial assistance to 
African countries aimed at improving trade competiveness and that this has been rising in the last 
decade. The same is true of other development IOs such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) 
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and bilateral donors such as the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DFID) and the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID). 
There are a number of areas in which more could be done. One is to provide more effective support 
for integration of African markets for goods, services and people. This is not to say that this is a 
subject that is ignored by policymakers and the international agencies. The New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is a focal point for regional cooperation and integration. The African 
Development Bank (AfDB) supports regional cooperation and integration efforts by lending for multi-
country projects and assisting African regional economic communities (RECs). The NEPAD initiative 
raised the profile of the regional integration agenda in AfDB activities, both policy based (e.g., 
banking and financial standards) and infrastructure development. The AfDB hosts the Africa 
Infrastructure Consortium Secretariat, and is tasked with facilitating cooperation on infrastructure 
development between itself, the AU, NEPAD, RECs and the members of the Consortium. Priority is 
being given by the AfDB to the promotion and development of regional infrastructure; in partnership 
with the AU and the UN Economic Commission for Africa.  
While the regional lens has been used as a focal point for assistance by the World Bank and other 
development organizations, the type of projects that have been pursued are mostly country-specific, 
reflecting the country-centric operating model that characterizes the way the IOs are organized. 
Lending by the development banks (AfDB and World Bank) for policy reforms that would support 
regional trade arguably is too limited owing to the difficulties in securing agreement between countries 
and achieving agreement on guarantees for multi-country loans (Hoekman and Njinkeu, 2012). Loans 
by the IOs can only be made to revenue earning, creditworthy regional entities, unless repayment 
obligations are assumed by member governments. Many regional bodies are not revenue earning and 
are dependent on financial contributions from their member governments, which themselves often face 
serious fiscal constraints. More fundamentally, regional projects are less likely to find their way into 
national development plans as a result of coordination problems. A challenge then is to ensure that 
sufficient attention is given to determining the relative direct importance of regional projects and 
cooperation for countries, the potential positive externalities that could be achieved and finding 
solutions in cases where country-specific capacity constraints preclude the appropriate level of 
regional cooperation (supply of a regional public good).  
Another, more specific challenge is to devote greater attention in the context of integration efforts 
on matters such as trade facilitation and expanding trade in services (integrating services markets). 
These are areas that increasingly are getting more attention from policymakers, creating opportunities 
to increase the coherence of what the IOs do in both areas and by doing so supporting greater progress 
on African economic integration. At present full use is not being made of these opportunities. One 
illustration of this is the limited support that African countries have been giving to the trade facilitation 
talks in Geneva. Another is the lack of engagement in efforts to agree on liberalization of services 
trade and investment policies, and for dealing with nontariff measures more generally. By not 
leveraging the WTO process to make progress in facilitating trade and reducing trade costs, a 
significant opportunity cost is incurred. Particularly worrisome in this regard are some of the 
arguments that are offered as to why African countries should resist accepting new disciplines on trade 
facilitation (Ismail, 2012) or avoid taking action to liberalize access to services markets. By not doing 
so – or, equivalently, by insisting on a mercantilist quid pro quo for agreeing to move forward on trade 
facilitation that they do not have the market power to achieve – firms and workers in Africa will 
continue to be confronted with higher trade and operating costs that precludes them from integrating 
into value chains (Draper and Lawrence, 2013).  
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The greater focus by IOs like the World Bank on economic integration and increasing trade 
competitiveness in the decade following the launch of the DDA is a reflection of greater demand for 
assistance by governments in these areas. The increasing demand for – and engagement in – trade 
facilitation projects suggests a disconnect between the positions that are often taken in Geneva and 
what governments are doing at home. There is less of a disconnect when it comes to the manner in 
which use is made of the development IOs, but their support could be made more effective. Arguably 
IOs can do more to provide more effective assistance for putting in place the institutional mechanisms 
to launch and sustain the processes that are needed to make major inroads on trade costs. Trade 
facilitation, dealing with NTMs and integrating services markets is much more complex than 
traditional trade liberalization (WEF, 2013; Cadot and Malouche, 2012; Hoekman and Mattoo, 2013).  
Tariffs can be reduced at the stroke of a pen by the Minister of Finance, regulatory reform cannot. 
Bringing the relevant players together, including the business community and the regulatory agencies, 
is a precondition for establishing a performance baseline and thus a common understanding of the 
impacts on traders/investors and the opportunity costs that are incurred (Cadot et al, 2012). 
Establishing trust is paramount if the various parties are to engage fully and openly. Greater coherence 
requires mechanisms that are used to build agreement on what the priorities are from an integration 
perspective, to define what policy disciplines could usefully be embedded in trade agreements, as well 
as a means to agree with development IOs what support should be provided and who will provide it, 
and to mobilize business in monitoring implementation and outcomes. A major factor impeding 
progress in the WTO, as well as in PTAs, both North-South such as the Economic Partnership 
Agreements with the EU (see Hancock in this volume) and among African nations, in dealing with 
NTBs, facilitating trade in goods and liberalizing services-related transactions is that there is often no 
concrete action plan, performance metrics/indicators and “ownership” of such an agenda. This requires 
not just creating institutional mechanisms that allow participation by all the main stakeholders and that 
have solid governance and accountability features, but sustained engagement and support for the 
people and entities that are tasked with managing such mechanisms and processes. 
What follows takes a “supply chain perspective” to illustrate several types of opportunities that 
exist for greater coherence and effectiveness. For reasons already noted supply chains offer significant 
prospects for African firms to increase their participation in regional and global trade. It does so 
because this is an area where the potential gains are large and the redistributive impacts of taking 
action to reduce the barriers are less stark than those associated with reducing market access 
restrictions narrowly defined.
12
 A supply chain lens is also helpful in identifying where IOs like the 
World Bank can be more effective in the provision of trade-related assistance from an economic 
integration perspective and in informing the design of rules of the game that would be beneficial to 
embed in trade agreements.  
A company’s ability to participate in supply chains depends greatly on government policy choices 
such as the extent of restrictions on market access at home and in export markets, and the efficiency of 
border management and transport and logistics services. Even if tariffs on exported goods are zero, 
firms that confront high and uncertain border costs, complex and restrictive rules of origin, and 
inefficient and unpredictable logistics services will not be able to compete with firms in countries that 
do not confront such costs. A major challenge in making progress to reduce trade costs is to determine 
what exactly needs to be done. Often it is not enough to fix just one thing or another. In practice a 
“bundle” of policy-induced constraints may need to be addressed for a supply chain to become 
feasible, or for firms to invest in the facilities that are needed to make a value chain work. 
                                                     
12
 This is because supply chain barriers often do not generate much in the way of rents, but instead simply raise costs. In 
contrast, and import tariff, for example, generates revenues for the government and rents for import-competing industries 
that are paid for by consumers. Liberalization distributes income from producers to consumers, while removal of many 
supply chain barriers will increase real incomes by lowering the costs of goods.  
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A recent report by the World Economic Forum, Bain & Co. and the World Bank (WEF et al., 2013) 
concludes that a necessary condition a comprehensive approach to reducing supply chain barriers is 
for governments to engage with the business community. Firms that are involved in the management 
of value chains, that provide transport and logistics services or that are engaged in wholesale and retail 
distribution can all provide information on the factors that affect (reduce) supply chain efficiency. A 
first challenge is therefore to elicit this information from them. A central component of any such effort 
is the creation of mechanisms to collect data on factors affecting supply chain operations. These data 
can then be used to identify ‘clusters’ of policies that jointly generate the major supply chain barriers 
for industries that are particularly important or that have the greatest potential (based on inputs from 
business and economic analysis). A second challenge is therefore to design and put in place 
mechanisms that can be used to identify these priority clusters of policies are and agree on a specific 
implementation action plan to address the different policy-induced constraints that are identified. A 
third challenge is to ensure that this process includes feedback loops between government and firms to 
allow everyone to monitor progress, which again will have to include a mechanism through which data 
can be channelled on whether performance indicators are improving.
13
  
This may seem a rather obvious prescription but such approaches are rarely pursued with an 
explicit focus on what matters from a supply chain perspective. Instead governments (and thus IOs) 
tend to focus on specific policy areas such as Customs; transport; standards; etc. A supply chain lens 
would ensure that a cross-cutting approach is taken towards identifying barriers, and that what matters 
most from an investment/operations viewpoint will be identified. A practical constraint that may 
impede initiatives along these lines is unwillingness by firms to provide data or to inform the 
government about some of the constraints that they face (e.g., related to corruption or other abuse of 
power).
14
 This suggests a role for IOs – to be facilitators that help to design and put in place 
mechanisms that assure firms of confidentiality in case of sensitive information and that assure 
governments that the information that is being tabled is accurate.  
Another role could be to support mechanisms to identify proposed priority areas for action that will 
promote the general interest as opposed to only benefiting a few companies. In practice, many of the 
policies that impede economic integration are regulatory in nature; they are generated by a multiplicity 
of agencies that impose compliance requirements on firms/traders.
15
 Very often there is little if any 
communication/coordination among such agencies. Making progress in removing or reducing the 
supply chain barriers that prevail requires coordination across many government agencies as well as 
engagement with industry. Involving economic agencies such as competition authorities that will take 
an economy-wide view and focus on the interests of consumers would help ensure that efforts are 
directed at reforms that will promote the general welfare. Steps in this direction can be made through 
the creation of a high-level body that has the mandate to bring the relevant regulatory bodies and 
enforcement agencies together, enhance the understanding of all concerned regarding the effects of the 
status quo on trade and identify approaches that can reduce negative trade impacts while not 
impinging on the achievement of regulatory objectives.  
Such approaches can also be pursued with a view to furthering regional integration and more 
generally the negotiation of trade agreements. A “whole of the supply chain” approach will help 
ensure that in negotiating the removal of barriers a comprehensive approach is pursued as opposed to 
one that centres primarily on specific policy instruments. International trade agreements tend to take a 
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 The aim here is not simply to give the private sector – whether local or multinational – what they want and increase their 
profits. The focus is on what will enhance the general welfare by reducing trade costs that are redundant thereby 
benefiting consumers and increasing real incomes.  
14
 Only one out of some 20 companies that were the source of detailed case studies of the types of supply chain barriers that 
prevail in their operations on specific trade lanes/in specific countries were willing to be named in the WEF et al. 2013 
report.  
15
 Most NTBs are due to the enforcement of regulatory provisions that are either product- or industry/activity- specific.  
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silo approach, addressing policy areas in isolation. Lowering supply chain barriers requires a more 
flexible and cross-cutting approach that spans all policy measures that impact on trade logistics, 
including those affecting services such as transport and distribution, as well as those related to border 
protection and management, product health and safety, foreign investment, and the movement of 
business people and service providers. In this regard there is great scope for greater coherence between 
what is needed from an economic integration perspective and the approach that is taken in trade 
agreements. 
Another approach that can enhance coherence and thus the effectiveness of assistance is to focus on 
NTMs and services. International cooperation can do more to help support economic integration 
through processes that aim to deal with the main constraints that impede progress in reducing the 
incidence of NTMs and opening services markets to greater competition. The negotiation literature 
stresses that negotiators need to learn about the preferences and interests of other parties, as well as 
their own, and this is a process that that takes time. Negotiations invariably involve a complex process 
of interaction between domestic groups that result in an understanding of negotiating 
objectives/priorities. Learning is critical when it comes to the substance of policy rules—officials and 
stakeholders need to understand what the implications are of a given proposed rule and how it will 
impact on the economy. Hoekman and Mattoo (2013) argue that establishment of “knowledge 
platforms” – fora aimed at fostering a substantive, evidence/analysis-based discussion of the impacts 
of sector-specific regulatory policies and NTMs – could help build a common understanding of where 
there are large potential gains from opening markets to greater competition, the preconditions for 
realizing such gains, and options to address possible negative distributional consequences of policy 
reforms. Generating information on the impact and experience with reform programs that were 
pursued in other countries could help governments both assess prevailing policies and institutions in 
their own nations, and identify policy reform options. 
Such fora could fulfil a number of roles.  
 First, a mechanism through which information is generated on prevailing regulatory measures 
and their effects on prices and trade flows.  
 Second, enhance knowledge of experiences and impacts in other countries, in the process 
identifying alternative options/good practices through collection and sharing of information Such 
learning can help ensure that regulations and standards that are adopted reflect local conditions 
and capacities for effective implementation.  
 Third, by bringing together representatives of a range of countries, including officials, 
regulators, and services suppliers, governments can discuss and learn about alternative 
approaches that have been pursued in practice to address the political economy constraints that 
may impede pro-competitive regulatory reform. 
 Fourth, identify the need for external financial and technical assistance and thus help 
governments allocate aid for trade more effectively. 
Any mechanism to identify good practices in regulation must be broad-based and tap into knowledge 
across the globe for a specific sector or issue. International sectoral organizations such as the 
International Telecommunications Union for information and telecommunications services); the Bank 
for International Settlements, the International Accounting Standards Board and the Berne Union (for 
financial sector-related standards/regulation), the International Organization for Migration (for 
migration and cross-border movement of people); and networks of sectoral regulators and related 
institutions (such as the International Competition Network) could be the focal points for specific 
activities. The same applies to entities such as the Asia Pacific Economic Forum, the OECD, UN 
agencies, and business associations. In practice knowledge platforms may best be designed on a 
regional basis, linked to PTAs and regional institutions (such as regional development banks). A few 
initiatives along these lines have been launched in recent years, including one on professional services 
in the context of the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) (Dihel, 2012).  
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5. Conclusion 
Much progress arguably has been made in the last decade to increase the degree of coherence in what 
development IOs do to respond to the priorities areas in which governments seek support. Progress has 
also been made to make the global trading system a more effective instrument to support economic 
integration, including the move by the EU through its Everything But Arms DFQF initiative for LDCs, 
similar initiatives by a number of other OECD countries, and the Aid for Trade initiative. But a good 
case can be made that there is still much that can be done to improve coherence of policies and impact 
of the support that is provided by IOs. As far as participation in the WTO is concerned, the continued 
insistence on traditional forms of special and differential treatment is arguably an opportunity lost. The 
trade facilitation, services and NTM agendas that are on the table in the WTO are all policy areas that 
are of great importance from a development perspective. Economic integration can be an effective 
instrument to improve development outcomes. A new approach that revolves around a positive agenda 
could have a much greater impact in supporting economic integration. Pursuing such an agenda would 
help to improve coherence by creating focal points in the WTO that can be used by governments to 
pursue desirable reforms, and by development IOs to support not just implementation of what are 
agreed to be good practices but to help put in place complementary measures to increase the benefits 
of implementation of trade commitments.  
Agreement on binding (enforceable) disciplines is an important role of the WTO and PTAs. But 
trade cooperation can and should go beyond the negotiation of binding rules of the game. Mechanisms 
of the type discussed in this paper can be pursued not just at the national or regional level but at the 
global (WTO) level. Reducing the trade-impeding effects of regulation requires consultative processes 
and dialogue through which agents can increase their understanding of the issues and the options that 
may exist to reduce trade costs without doing harm to the objectives that underlie regulation. There is 
no reason why existing WTO committees and groups cannot do more to have such exchanges and to 
promote greater learning about country experiences, involving not just government officials but 
drawing on data and information provided by businesses and other IOs.  
More fundamentally, there is arguably a need to go beyond business as usual in the approaches that 
are taken by governments to facilitate trade. Shifting from pursuit of cooperation on a policy 
instrument basis (tariffs, licensing, customs valuation, services, IPRs, etc.) to a supply chain-informed 
approach could do much to make trade agreements and trade assistance more relevant to business, 
resulting in greater trade expansion by creating greater incentives for investment and job creation. This 
will be difficult to do given that as it implies much more coordination across government and 
regulatory agencies and structured engagement with the business community. It will also be 
challenging for development organizations as the same challenge arises there: to cut through the many 
silos that have been created to provide support to specific “sectors” – e.g., transport – or to deal with 
specific policy areas – e.g., Customs reform. A supply chain focus would imply that all of the main 
bottlenecks, chokepoints and sources of uncertainty and variability would be on the table, not just 
those aspects that a government agency happens to request assistance on. It would also help improve 
coherence by encouraging greater cooperation and coordination across IOs and other development 
organizations by identifying a cluster of areas where action is needed.  
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